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DISCRIMINATION IN THE SMALL-BUSINESS CREDIT MARKET 
David G. Blanchflower, Phillip B. Levine, and David J. Zimmerman* 
Abstract-We use data from the 1993 and 1998 National Surveys of Small 
Business Finances to examine the existence of racial discrimination in the 
small-business credit market. We conduct an econometric analysis of loan 
outcomes by race and find that black-owned small businesses are about 
twice as likely to be denied credit even after controlling for differences in 
creditworthiness and other factors. A series of specification checks indi- 
cates that this gap is unlikely to be explained by omitted variable bias. 
These results indicate that the racial disparity in credit availability is likely 
caused by discrimination. 
I. Introduction 
Discrimination occurs whenever the terms of a transac- 
tion are affected by personal characteristics of the 
participants that are not relevant to the transaction. In credit 
markets, discrimination on the basis of race and/or gender 
exist if loan approval rates or interest rates charged differ 
across groups with equal ability to repay. Although concep- 
tually this definition is rather straightforward, empirically it 
is often difficult to operationalize because the data require- 
ments to make ceteris paribus comparisons across firms are 
extensive. 
In this paper we use data from the 1993 and 1998 
National Surveys of Small Business Finances to examine 
the existence of discrimination in the small-business credit 
market. We initially provide qualitative evidence consistent 
with the view that blacks are discriminated against in this 
market. For example, we find that black-owned firms are 
much more likely to report being seriously concerned with 
credit market problems and report being less likely to apply 
for credit because they fear the loan would be denied. 
Although this evidence is suggestive of discrimination, it 
certainly does not represent strong evidence on its own. 
We then take advantage of the wealth of information 
available in these data sources to conduct an econometric 
exercise designed to statistically identify discrimination in 
credit markets. Both years of this survey provide great detail 
regarding which firms applied for loans and which firms 
were approved, along with the characteristics of the firm, its 
creditworthiness, and other factors. Data from 1998 go even 
further by providing firms' credit ratings from Dunn and 
Bradstreet and the personal housing and nonhousing net 
worth of the firms' owners that can be used as collateral to 
secure these loans. Although these factors go a long way 
towards creating ceteris paribus comparisons, we also pro- 
vide a number of specification checks that enable us to 
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further examine whether there are alternative explanations 
for our results. 
We find that black-owned firms, in particular, are sub- 
stantially more likely to be denied credit than other groups 
and are charged higher interest rates for those loans that are 
approved than are other firms that are otherwise compara- 
ble. All the specification checks we conduct support the 
view that these results are unlikely to be attributable to other 
factors. Overall, our findings support the view that black- 
owned firms are discriminated against in the small-business 
credit market. 
II. Background 
Although not much previous research has examined dis- 
crimination in small-business credit markets, there has been 
an active debate on the question of whether banks discrim- 
inate against minority applicants for mortgages. In an influ- 
ential study in that area, researchers at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Boston tried to collect any information that might 
be deemed economically relevant to whether a loan would 
be approved, along with the borrower's race (Munnell et al., 
1996). In the raw data whites had 10% of their loans 
rejected, versus 28% for blacks and Hispanics. After con- 
trolling for the large number of variables collected to estab- 
lish the creditworthiness of the borrowers (including the 
amount of the debt, debt/income ratio, credit history, and 
loan characteristics) blacks were still 8 percentage points 
less likely to be granted the loan. 
A variety of criticisms have been launched at this study 
(see, for example, Home, 1994; Day and Liebowitz, 1998; 
Harrison, 1998); responses to these criticisms are found in 
Browne and Tootell (1995). The most common critique 
indicates that we cannot make a determination of discrim- 
ination unless those blacks whose loans are approved have 
a greater likelihood of repayment. This argument rests 
critically upon an implied assumption that the distribution 
of repayment probabilities for blacks and whites is identical, 
as shown in figure 1. Panel A of this figure indicates that if 
this assumption is met and if firms discriminate against 
blacks by setting a higher bar for loan approval, then the 
mean rate of repayment among blacks conditional upon 
loan approval will be higher for blacks than for whites. 
On the other hand, Panel B of figure 1 shows that if the 
distribution of loan repayment probabilities is different, then 
it is unclear what the difference will be in mean repayment 
probabilities conditional upon approval. In this panel, 
blacks collectively have a lower repayment probability; if 
lenders established a uniform cutoff in determining which 
loans get accepted, whites would be more likely to repay 
their loan. If lenders then chose to raise the bar for black- 
owned firms, the racial differential in loan repayment would 
depend upon the extent to which the bar was raised. This 
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FIGURE 1.-HYPOTHETICAL EFFECTS OF DISCRIMINATION ON LOAN 
DEFAULT RATES FOR WHITE- AND BLACK-OWNED FIRMS 
loan approval cutoff: white-owned firms 
loan approval cut-off: black-owned firms 
> white- and black-owned firms 
N0Z 
Probability of Repayment 
Panel A: Discrimination Reduces Default Rates for Black-Owned Firms 
loan approval cut-off: white-owned firms 
loan approval cut-off: black-owned firms 
\X \^ black-owned firms 
~"~\ \. white-owned firms 
Probability of Repayment 
Panel B: Discrimination Has Ambiguous Impact on Default Rates 
example would represent statistical discrimination on the 
part of firms. There will be some blacks who are denied 
loans despite being as likely as some whites to repay it, 
simply because the group of which they are a member has 
a lower repayment probability. For the purposes of this 
research, we apply a legalistic definition of discrimination 
that would encompass any disparity in loan denial rates 
between applicants of different races that is not attributable 
to differences in other characteristics besides race.1 There- 
fore, differences in repayment probabilities are not neces- 
sary to prove discrimination. 
We were only able to identify one published paper that 
has investigated the specific topic of racial differentials in 
access to credit among small businesses. Cavalluzzo and 
Cavalluzzo (1998) use data from the 1988-1989 National 
1 For instance, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act prohibits discrimination 
in access to credit by race and would apply to both Becker-type and 
statistical discrimination. 
Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF), conducted by 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, to 
analyze differences in application rates, denial rates, and 
other outcomes by race and gender in a manner similar to 
the econometric models reported in this study. This paper 
documents that a large discrepancy does exist in credit 
access between white-owned and minority-owned firms that 
cannot be explained by a handful of characteristics of firms. 
Unfortunately, the earlier NSSBF data did not oversample 
minority-owned firms and included limited information on 
credit histories of firms and owners, reducing its ability to 
provide a powerful test of the causal influence of race on 
loan decisions. 
III. Empirical Framework and Description of the Data 
Differences in loan denial rates or interest rates charged 
do not, in and of themselves, prove that discrimination 
exists. Evidence of discrimination would require a finding 
that these differences exist among firms that have the same 
risk of default. To this end, in the spirit of the Munnell et al. 
(1996), we study and estimate loan denial and interest rate 
models that include measures of a firm's creditworthiness, 
other firm characteristics, and the race/ethnicity and gender 
of the firm's ownership. Within this framework, evidence of 
discrimination would exist if the coefficients on race and/or 
gender are significantly greater than 0. 
To estimate this model, we use national data available 
from the 1993 and 1998 National Survey of Small Business 
Finances (NSSBF). These data contain substantial informa- 
tion regarding credit availability on a nationally represen- 
tative sample of small businesses. The 1993 survey was 
conducted during 1994-1995 for the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System and the U.S. Small Business 
Administration; the data relate to the years 1992 and 1993. 
The 1993 data file used here contains 4,637 firms with less 
than 500 employees.2 Minority-owned firms were over- 
sampled, but sampling weights are provided to generate 
nationally representative estimates. 
The 1998 survey (conducted in 1999 and 2000 for firms 
in business in 1998) collected information on 3,561 firms in 
a similar manner to its predecessor. This survey provides 
two main advantages over the earlier survey. First, the 1998 
survey contains a credit rating score for each firm in it, 
obtained from Dunn and Bradstreet, that can be used to help 
control for a firm's creditworthiness.3 Dunn and Bradstreet 
is the leading provider of credit ratings in the country, 
2 The median sizes were 5.5 and 5.0 and the mean sizes were 31.6 and 
25.5 full-time equivalent employees in 1993 and 1998, respectively; 440 
firms out of 4,637 in 1993 and 263 firms out of 3,561 in 1998 had 100 
full-time equivalent employees or more. For further details regarding the 
1993 NSSBF survey see the Data Appendix provided in Blanchflower, 
Levine, and Zimmerman (1998). 
3 Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken (1999) were able to incorporate 
Dun and Bradstreet credit ratings for each firm using the 1993 NSSBF 
because their connection to the Federal Reserve Board enabled them to 
access the confidential firm identifiers. 
-I 
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collecting information on 13 million firms nationwide from 
a multitude of sources, including a firm's past experiences 
with banks, public utility payment histories, and trade ex- 
periences with other firms. Second, the 1998 survey col- 
lected information on the housing and nonhousing net worth 
of firm owners. Since these forms of wealth may be used as 
collateral for small-business loans, the availability of this 
information enables us to control for this additional contrib- 
utor to the likelihood a loan is repaid. One limitation of 
these data relative to the 1993 survey, however, is that 
information on loan applications was obtained for a smaller 
number of loans, somewhat reducing the sample size avail- 
able.4 This makes it difficult to conduct some of the addi- 
tional specification checks that we are able to perform with 
the 1993 survey. 
Table 1 presents weighted sample means from these data 
for all firms that applied for credit, by race/ethnicity.5 The 
estimates indicate that black-owned firms are more than 
twice as likely to have a loan application rejected as white- 
owned firms (65.9% versus 26.9% in 1993, and 62.3% 
versus 28.8% in 1998).6 Other minority groups are denied at 
rates higher than whites as well, but the magnitude of the 
black-white differential is especially striking. For those 
loans that were approved, black-owned firms also had to pay 
rates of interest that were 1 percentage point higher in 1993 
and 1.7 percentage point higher in 1998. Minority-owned 
firms, however, do have characteristics that are different 
than those of white-owned firms that may have contributed 
to these differences. For instance, minority-owned firms 
were younger and smaller (whether measured in terms of 
sales or employment) than their white counterparts. 
Black-owned firms, in particular, were also generally less 
creditworthy than firms owned by other racial groups mea- 
sured by whether the owner had: (a) been bankrupt over the 
preceding 7 years, (b) had been delinquent for more than 60 
days on personal obligations over the preceding 3 years, or 
(c) had legal judgments against him or her over the preced- 
ing 3 years; or (d) over the preceding three years, the firm 
had been delinquent for more than 60 days on business 
obligations. Moreover, data from the 1998 survey provide 
4 The 1993 survey inquired about any loan applications made in the past 
3 years, whereas the 1998 survey asked about "new" loans (those that do 
not serve as an extension of a previous loan). Along with the smaller 
sample size of the survey as a whole, the 1998 survey contains many 
fewer loan applications (927) than the 1993 survey (2,007). 5 Differences in denial rates by gender are negligible. In 1993 28% of 
male-owned firms had their loan application denied, compared to 32% of 
female-owned firms. In 1998 29% of male-owned firms had their loan 
application denied, compared to 28% of female-owned firms. Likewise, 
differences in firm attributes by gender are observed, but they are not 
large. 
6 Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998) examined these outcomes using the 
1987 NSSBF and similarly found that denial rates (weighted) are consid- 
erably lower for minorities. White-owned firms had a denial rate for loans 
of 22% compared with 56% for blacks, 36% for Hispanics, and 24% for 
other races, which are broadly similar to the differences reported here. 
These estimates for minority groups are less precise, however, because of 
the relatively small number of minority-owned firms in the sample. 
even better measures of a firm's creditworthiness, available 
from Dunn and Bradstreet. These data indicate that black- 
owned firms have a higher risk of loan default, according to 
their credit ratings. The 1998 data also indicates that black 
small-business owners have less personal wealth available 
that could be used as collateral for a business loan. 
IV. Qualitative Evidence 
Before moving on to the results of our multivariate 
analysis, we first report on what business owners themselves 
say are the main problems confronting them. This evidence, 
though obviously not conclusive in determining whether 
discrimination exists, does highlight firms' perceptions re- 
garding discrimination in obtaining credit. To the extent that 
black-owned firms report greater difficulty in obtaining 
credit than white-owned firms, but report other types of 
problems no more frequently, it would suggest either that 
discrimination takes place or that perceptions of discrimi- 
nation exist which are unwarranted. It therefore comple- 
ments the econometric analysis provided below, which can 
distinguish between these two hypotheses. 
Table 2 reports the results of asking specific questions 
about problems facing firms.7 Different types of questions 
were asked in the two surveys, and this is reflected in each 
panel of this table. In the top panel we report the percentage 
of firms in the 1993 survey that report a particular problem 
was serious in the past 12 months. Blacks were much more 
likely to say that credit market conditions had been a serious 
problem (31%) than were Hispanics (23%), whites (13%) or 
those from other racial groups (13%). Regarding other 
problems, however, differences by race are much less pro- 
nounced.8 The finding that black firms are largely indistin- 
guishable from white firms in reporting a variety of prob- 
lems, except for the case of credit, indicates that minority- 
owned firms perceive that credit availability really is a 
problem for them. 
The remainder of table 2 reports more forward-looking 
problems that firms face. The middle panel reports the 
percentage of 1993 NSSBF respondents indicating that a 
particular issue is the most important that they were likely to 
confront over the 12-month period from the date of inter- 
view. The bottom panel reports firms' responses in the 1998 
survey regarding the most important problem facing the 
firm today. In both cases, the ability to obtain a loan at 
7 Blanchflower et al. (1998) present similar evidence to that reported 
here from an additional data set, the 1992 Characteristics of Business 
Owners Survey, which was conducted by the Bureau of the Census. 
Results of analogous exercises to those in table 2, but restricted to the 
sample of firms that applied for loans, yield similar comparisons across 
firms distinguished by race/ethnicity and gender. 
8 We also estimated a series of ordered logit equations (available on 
request) to control for differences across firms in their creditworthiness, 
location, industry size, and the like. It is apparent from these regressions 
that blacks were more likely to report that credit market conditions were 
especially serious. Only in the case of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
were blacks significantly more likely to report a problem. 
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TABLE 1.-SELECTED SAMPLE MEANS OF LOAN APPLICANTS FROM 1993 AND 1998 NSSBF DATA 
All White Black 
1993 Data 
% of loan applications denied 
Interest rate charged on approved loans (%) 
28.8 
8.8 
26.9 
8.7 
65.9 
9.7 
Credit History of Firm/Owners 
% owners with judgments against them 
% firms delinquent in business obligations 
% owners delinquent on personal obligations 
% owners declared bankruptcy in past 7 yr 
4.8 
24.2 
14.0 
2.4 
4.1 
23.1 
12.6 
2.4 
16.9 
49.0 
43.4 
5.3 
Selected Other Firm Characteristics 
Sales (1,000s of 1992 $) 
Profits (1,000s of 1992 $) 
Assets (1,000s of 1992 $) 
Liabilities (1,000s of 1992 $) 
Total full-time employment in 1992 
Firm age (years) 
Amount requested (1,000s of 1992 $) 
% Loans to be used for working capital 
% Loans to be used for equipment/machinery 
% Loans to be used for land/buildings 
% Loan to be backed by real estate 
Sample size (unweighted) 
1795 
87 
889 
547 
13.6 
13.4 
1871 
85 
922 
573 
13.9 
13.6 
Characteristics of Loan Application 
289 299 
49.5 48.4 
15.2 14.9 
11.6 11.9 
28.3 28.6 
2,007 
1998 Data 
28.8 
9.4 
% of loan applications denied 
Interest rate charged on approved loans (%) 
1,648 
24.4 
9.3 
Credit History of Firm/Owners 
% owners with judgments against them 
% firms delinquent in business obligations 
% owners delinquent on personal obligations 
% owners declared bankruptcy in past 7 yr 
3.8 
13.5 
12.4 
2.5 
3.3 
13.3 
11.6 
2.2 
Selected Other Firm Characteristics 
Sales (1,000s of 1998 $) 
Profits (1,000s of 1998 $) 
Assets (1,000s of 1998 $) 
Liabilities (1,000s of 1998 $) 
Total full-time employment in 1998 
Firm age (years) 
Owner's home equity value (1,000s of 1998 $) 
Owner's personal nonhousing net worth (1,000s of 1998 $) 
Chai 
Amount requested (1,000s of 1998 $) 
Dun & Bradstreet low risk 
Dun & Bradstreet moderate risk 
Dun & Bradstreet average risk 
Dun & Bradstreet significant risk 
Dun & Bradstreet high risk 
Sample size (unweighted) 
984 
131 
413 
248 
8.6 
13.3 
129 
476 
1066 
138 
449 
265 
9.0 
13.8 
134 
513 
racteristics of Loan Application 
167 172 
5.3 5.9 
26.2 27.0 
39.5 39.5 
21.8 20.8 
7.2 6.8 
3,561 2,847 
Sample weights are used to provide statistics that are nationally representative of all small businesses. Some variable means are computed from slightly smaller samples because of missing values. 
Source: Authors' calculations from 1993 and 1998 NSSBF. 
favorable interest rates appears to be an important concern 
for minority firms. Black-owned firms are three times more 
likely than whites to report financing and interest rates as 
the most important problem they face. Among the other 
responses provided, cash flow, in particular, appears to be a 
more common concern for blacks than for whites, but this 
may be endogenous to the credit available to them. 
In addition, black-owned firms appear to behave in a 
manner consistent with these beliefs. Data indicate that 
black- and Hispanic-owned firms are much more likely to 
report that they did not apply for a loan, even though they 
needed credit, because they thought they would be rejected. 
Black- and Hispanic-owned firms are 40 and 23 percentage 
points, respectively, more likely to withhold an application 
933 
Hispanic Other Race 
35.9 
9.2 
40.0 
8.7 
15.2 
31.6 
24.5 
0.8 
5.2 
25.1 
14.8 
2.0 
1361 
189 
746 
309 
10.8 
13.3 
172 
62.3 
16.0 
10.5 
26.2 
96 
589 
60 
230 
146 
8.3 
11.5 
122 
62.5 
15.2 
3.7 
24.7 
170 
62.3 
11.0 
1309 
54 
747 
486 
12.3 
9.3 
298 
51.6 
21.7 
11.9 
24.7 
93 
54.5 
9.6 
9.7 
21.2 
30.4 
6.0 
47.0 
10.2 
5.0 
8.0 
10.8 
2.0 
6.6 
16.1 
13.1 
4.6 
279 
106 
78 
77 
5.1 
11.0 
73 
156 
47 
0.7 
15.7 
38.5 
34.5 
10.6 
274 
391 
35 
142 
118 
6.1 
11.3 
84 
236 
171 
3.3 
24.6 
34.8 
24.9 
12.4 
195 
674 
105 
290 
210 
7.1 
10.1 
129 
320 
184 
2.3 
22.4 
44.3 
25.1 
6.0 
245 
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TABLE 2.-PROBLEMS FACING FIRMS 
All White Black Hispanic Other 
1993 Data-Problems Experienced during Past 12 Months 
(% Reporting Problem is Serious) 
Credit market conditions 14 13 31 23 13 
Training costs 7 7 7 6 4 
Worker's compensation costs 22 21 19 30 29 
Health insurance costs 33 32 38 45 35 
IRS regulation or penalties 12 12 17 17 14 
Environmental regulations 8 8 6 7 11 
Americans with Disabilities Act 3 3 4 3 4 
Occupational Safety and Health Act 5 5 4 4 6 
Family and Medical Leave Act 3 3 5 3 5 
1993 Data-Problems Firms Expect to Face over the Next 12 Months 
(% Reporting Problem) 
Credit availability 6 6 21 5 4 
High interest rates 5 6 2 3 4 
Health care, health insurance 21 22 12 14 15 
Taxes, tax policy 6 6 3 8 4 
General U.S. business conditions 12 11 9 14 17 
Costs of conducting business 3 3 4 4 4 
Labor force problems 3 3 4 6 4 
Profits, cash flow, expansion, sales 10 10 20 10 12 
Number of observations (unweighted) 4,388 3,383 424 323 258 
1998 Data-Most Important Problem Facing Firm Today 
(% Reporting Problem) 
Financing and interest rates 7 6 18 10 8 
Taxes 7 7 2 5 3 
Poor sales 8 7 6 12 7 
Cost/availability of labor 4 4 3 2 4 
Government regulations/red tape 7 7 3 6 8 
Competition 11 11 11 9 18 
Quality of labor 13 13 11 10 9 
Cost and availability of insurance 2 2 1 1 0 
Cash flow 5 4 11 8 4 
Costs, other than labor 3 3 2 3 4 
Seasonal/cyclical issues 1 1 I 1 
Number of observations 3,561 2,743 274 245 195 
Source: Authors' calculations from 1993 and 1998 NSSBF. Note that the sample sizes by race in 1998 do not sum to the total sample size, because firms where ownership is shared equally by members of different 
races were not assigned a category in this survey. 
fearing denial than are white-owned firms in the 1993 
survey, and 32 and 9 percentage points, respectively, more 
likely to do so in the 1998 survey.9 Of course, some of the 
difference may be attributable to differences in creditwor- 
thiness across firms, in that firms that are bad credit risks 
should be afraid that their loan would be denied. In econo- 
metric models comparable to those reported below, we 
tested this alternative by holding constant differences in 
creditworthiness and other characteristics of firms. Al- 
though these factors do appear to explain some of this 
differential, we found that a gap of 26 (16) percentage 
points still exists between black-owned (Hispanic-owned) 
firms and white-owned firms, using data from 1993.10 In 
9 The actual percentages for each group are in 1993 are: 22.5% for 
white-owned businesses, 41.7% for Hispanic-owned businesses, and 
60.8% for black-owned businesses. In 1998, they are: 21.5% for white- 
owned businesses, 30.1% for Hispanic-owned businesses, and 53.9% for 
black-owned businesses. 
10 More details regarding this analysis, along with tables presenting the 
results, are available in Blanchflower et al. (1998). 
1998 these regression-adjusted differentials are 21% and 
4%, respectively. In fact, when asked directly why they 
were afraid to apply for loans, minority-owned firms were 
more likely to report prejudice as the reason (18% for 
black-owned firms, 5% for Hispanic-owned firms, and 2% 
for white-owned firms in 1993; 8% for black-owned firms, 
7% for Hispanic-owned firms, and 2% for white-owned 
firms in 1998).11 We will attempt to determine whether these 
perceptions reflect actual discrimination in the econometric 
analysis to follow. 
V. Econometric Evidence 
Evidence presented to this point indicates that minority- 
owned firms are more likely to be denied loans and to be 
charged higher rates of interest for those loans approved. 
1 The other reasons given, including too little collateral, poor credit 
history, and a poor balance sheet, are comparable across groups. (Firms 
could report more than one reason.) 
934 
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.223 on Wed, 21 Nov 2012 08:42:35 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
DISCRIMINATION I  THE SMALL-BUSINESS CREDIT MARKET 
TABLE 3.-MODELS OF LOAN DENIALS, 1993 AND 1998 NSSBF DATA (PROBIT DERIVATIVES; T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
Asian/Pacific Native Sample 
Specification: Additional Variables Included Black Islander American Hispanic Female Size 
1993 Data 
(1) None 0.426 0.207 -0.051 0.113 0.073 
(10.87) (3.90) (0.35) (.073) (2.54) 2,007 
(2) Model 1 plus creditworthiness measures and owner's education 0.277 0.160 -0.153 0.061 0.039 
(6.69) (3.02) (1.17) (1.27) (1.36) 2,007 
(3) Model 2 plus other firm characteristics and characteristics of 
the loan 0.225 0.120 -0.109 0.064 0.037 
(5.39) (2.27) (0.82) (1.31) (1.30) 1,997 
(4) Model 3 plus region and industry fixed effects 0.226 0.101 -0.062 0.036 0.026 
(5.12) (1.87) (0.43) (0.72) (0.88) 1,976 
(5) Model 4 plus month/year of application and type of financial 
institution fixed effects 0.234 0.100 -0.092 0.033 0.025 
(5.08) (1.80) (0.64) (0.65) (0.85) 1,964 
1998 Data 
(1) None 0.382 0.162 0.314 0.032 927 
(6.81) (2.64) (4.67) (0.85) 
(2) Model 1 plus other creditworthiness measures and 6 owner's 
education dummies 0.301 0.192 0.294 0.030 927 
(4.99) (2.99) (4.15) (0.78) 
(3) Model 2 plus Dunn and Bradstreet credit rating 0.281 0.187 0.280 0.022 927 
(4.67) (2.91) (3.95) (0.57) 
(4) Model 3 plus other firm characteristics and characteristics of 
the loan 0.250 0.155 0.240 0.000 927 
(4.18) (2.42) (3.40) (0.01) 
(5) Model 4 plus owner's housing and nonhousing wealth 0.241 0.146 0.237 0.001 927 
(4.08) (2.31) (3.39) (0.02) 
(6) Model 5 plus region and industry fixed effects 0.265 0.136 0.227 0.025 927 
(4.07) (2.07) (3.12) (0.64) 
(7) Model 6 plus year of application 0.301 0.135 0.215 0.039 927 
(4.48) (2.08) (3.01) (0.99) 
Each line of this table represents a separate regression with the specified regressors; "Creditworthiness measures" include whether or not the firm has been delinquent in a personal or business loan, whether the 
owner has declared bankruptcy in the past seven years, whether the owner has had any judgments against him/her, the firm's sales, profits, assets, and liabilities, and the owner's years of experience and share of 
the business. "Other firm characteristics" include for the 1993 data a dummy variable indicating whether the firm had a line of credit; 1990 employment; firm age; an MSA dummy variable; a new-firm-since-1990 
dummy variable S-corporation, C-corporation, and partnership dummy variables; 1990-1992 employment change; a dummy variable for an existing long-run relation with the lender, dummy variables identifying 
if the firm's market was regional, national, or international; the value of the firm's inventory; the level of wages and salaries paid to workers; officers' cash holdings; and the value of land held by the firm. For the 
1998 data "Other firm characteristics" include firm age, 1998 employment, five type-of-organization dummy variables, and four dummy variables identifying if the firm's market was regional, national, or 
international. "Characteristics of the loan" in 1993 include the size of the loan being applied for, a dummy variable indicating whether the loan was to be backed by real estate, and 11 dummy variables indicating 
the use of the loan. "Characteristics of the loan" in 1998 just includes the size of the loan being applied for. The dependent variable in all specifications is an indicator for whether or not a loan application was 
denied. Native Americans include American Indians and Alaskan Eskimo. In the 1998 data the categories "Asian/Pacific Islander" and "Native American" are combined due to small numbers of observations. 
Source: Authors' calculations from 1993 and 1998 NSSBF. 
Can these differences be explained by such things as dif- 
ferences in creditworthiness and other factors? To address 
this question we now turn to an econometric examination of 
loan denials and interest rates charged, holding constant 
differences across firms. 
A. Models of Loan Denials 
In the top panel of table 3 the results of estimating a series 
of loan denial probit models using data from the 1993 
NSSBF are reported. We report estimated derivatives from 
these models that can be interpreted as the effect on the 
probability of loan denial of an infinitesimal change in each 
independent continuous variable and the discrete change in 
the probability for dummy variables. In row (1), which 
contains only race and gender indicators, for instance, the 
coefficient of 0.426 can be interpreted as indicating that the 
denial rate for black-owned businesses is 42.6 percentage 
points higher than that for those firms in the excluded 
category of white-owned firms.12 Loan requests made by 
firms owned by Asian/Pacific Islanders, Hispanics, and 
women are also more likely to be denied, but the disadvan- 
tage for these groups is much smaller than that for black- 
owned small businesses. 
The next four rows include additional sets of explanatory 
variables to hold constant differences in the characteristics 
of firms that may vary by race.13 In row (2) a number of 
12 This estimate largely replicates the raw difference in denial rates 
between black- and white-owned businesses reported in table 1. The raw 
differential observed there (0.659 - 0.269 = 0.39) differs slightly from 
the 0.426 differential reported here because this specification also controls 
for whether the business is owned by a woman and because the regres- 
sions are unweighted whereas the descriptive statistics are weighted using 
the sample weights. When a full set of explanatory control variables are 
included, the unweighted estimates are insignificantly different from the 
weighted; hence in table 4 and subsequent tables we report only un- 
weighted estimates. 
13 In preliminary analyses, we also estimated these models separately, 
focusing specifically on the differences in coefficient estimates between 
whites and blacks because of the large raw differentials between them. 
The F-test we conducted to determine whether parameter estimates were 
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controls are included that distinguish the creditworthiness of 
the firm and the owner.14 Although not reported in the table, 
many are statistically significant on a two-tailed test at 
conventional levels of significance with the expected 
signs.15 Even after controlling for these differences in cred- 
itworthiness, black-owned firms remain 28 percentage 
points more likely to have their loan request denied than 
white-owned firms. Firms owned by Asian/Pacific Islanders 
also are at a disadvantage, of 16 percentage points, in terms 
of loan denials, but the coefficients on Hispanic- and female- 
owned firms become smaller and insignificant after these 
controls are added. 
The models reported in rows (3) through (5) control for a 
vast array of additional characteristics of firms. Row (3) 
adds a vector of 30 additional characteristics of the firm and 
the loan application, including such factors as level of 
employment, change in employment, the size of the loan 
request, and the use of the loan. Row (4) includes vectors of 
dummy variables to control for differences across regions of 
the country and the firm's industry. Row (5) appends 
dummy variables, indicating the month and year in which 
the loan was requested and the type of financial institution 
to which the firm applied.16 In total these three rows append 
an additional 164 variables to the more parsimonious pec- 
ification reported in row 2. 
Nevertheless, the estimated disadvantage xperienced by 
black-owned firms in obtaining credit falls by a relatively 
small amount. The estimate from each of the three addi- 
tional rows indicates that black-owned firms are approxi- 
mately 23 percentage points more likely to have their loan 
application denied than white-owned firms. The results also 
indicate that Asians/Pacific Islanders also had statistically 
significantly higher denial rates than whites (at the 10% 
level of significance). There is no evidence that denial rates 
for firms owned by other racial groups or women were 
significantly different from that of firms owned by whites 
or men. 
the same for blacks and whites rejected this null hypothesis. Then we used 
the estimates obtained by estimating the model separately by race and 
conducted an Oaxaca (1973) decomposition. The results from this analysis 
were similar to those obtained by restricting the coefficients to be the same 
between blacks and whites and using the coefficient on a black indicator 
variable to measure the gap between groups. We have chosen to report all 
the results in this simpler format for ease of exposition and interpretation. 
14 We have experimented with some combinations of variables (such as 
the ratio of debt to equity) as well as various other nonlinearities (such as 
quadratics in sales, profits, and employment) and found that the results 
were unaffected by these alternative functional forms. 15 Parameter estimates for these variables have been excluded from this 
table for the purposes of brevity, but Blanchflower et al. (1998) report all 
of them for the loan denial models using 1993 data. 
16 In 1993, approximately four out of five (80.5%) of the firms who 
required a loan applied to a commercial bank. Overall 17 different types 
of financial institution were used, although only the following accounted 
for more than 1% of the total (weighted): credit unions (2.0%), savings 
banks (2.5%), savings & loans (2.3%), finance companies (4.9%), lease 
companies (2.1%), and other business firms (1.7%). Comparable infor- 
The lower panel of table 3 presents a similar analysis of 
the 1998 NSSBF data, with the important differences that 
credit ratings from Dunn and Bradstreet and housing wealth 
and nonhousing net worth values of the owner are incorpo- 
rated as control variables. The first two rows in this panel 
are designed to exactly replicate models estimated using the 
1993 data and reported in the top half of the table. These 
models provide estimates of the effect of race and gender on 
loan denial rates with no other covariates and with a set of 
creditworthiness measures that are available in both sur- 
veys. Comparable results are obtained here regarding the 
disadvantage faced by black-owned firms. With no other 
controls, in the 1998 data blacks are 38 percentage points 
more likely to have their loan denied; adding measures of 
creditworthiness reduces this differential to 30 percentage 
points. The only important difference observed in these 
results between 1993 and 1998 is that Hispanics now appear 
to face greater difficulty getting their loan applications 
approved. In the more recent data, Hispanics face a disad- 
vantage in the loan market similar to that of blacks. 
The third row of this panel adds credit rating data from 
Dunn and Bradstreet as an explanatory variable. The results 
indicate that incorporating this additional control on a firm's 
creditworthiness has a negligible effect on the results. 
Blacks are still 28 percentage points less likely to have their 
loan application approved than white-owned firms. This 
finding supports the use of the set of controls for creditwor- 
thiness that we are able to employ when using the 1993 data. 
The fourth and fifth rows of this panel examine the 
additional impact of controlling for other characteristics of 
the owner and the loan. In the fourth row, covariates 
comparable to those available in 1993 are added. In this 
specification the coefficient on black-owned firms is slightly 
smaller than in models that omit these additional variables. 
In the fifth row, we also add the owner's wealth measures, 
which are also shown to have very little impact on the 
estimated disadvantage that black-owned firms face in the 
credit market. These findings also support the notion that the 
analysis using 1993 data, for which owner's wealth data are 
absent, are not biased by this omission. With all these 
covariates included in the regression, black-owned firms 
still face a 24-percentage-point disadvantage in getting their 
loan applications approved. 
The remainder of this panel adds region and industry 
fixed effects along with fixed effects reflecting the year of 
application. Even after controlling for this extensive array of 
covariates, we still find that black-owned firms are about 30 
percentage points more likely to have their loan application 
denied than white-owned firms. Similar to the analysis 
using 1993 data, Asian/Pacific Islanders are about 14% 
more likely than a white small business owner to have their 
loan application denied. Unlike 1993, however, Hispanics 
are found to be significantly more likely to have their loan 
application denied. They face a surplus of about 22 percent- 
mation for 1998 is unavailable. 
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B. Specification Checks 
Although the results provided so far strongly indicate that 
financial institutions treat black- and white-owned small 
businesses differently in lending, other considerations may 
limit our ability to interpret this finding as discrimination. 
Of perhaps greatest concern is the possibility that we may 
not have adequately controlled for differences in creditwor- 
thiness of firms. If black-owned firms are less creditworthy 
and we have failed to sufficiently capture the differences, 
even with our extensive set of control variables, then we 
would be inappropriately attributing the racial difference in 
loan denial rates and interest rates to discrimination.17 
To address this potentially serious problem, our first 
approach was to identify the types of information that 
financial institutions collect in order to evaluate a loan 
application and compare that with the information available 
to us in the NSSBF. First, we went to some local banks and 
obtained small-business loan applications. Second, we 
searched the Internet and examined Web sites that provide 
general business advice to small firms, including a descrip- 
tion of the loan application process and the information 
typically requested of applicants.18 
We found that detailed information is requested of both 
the firm and its owner. Regarding the firm, banks typically 
request information like the following: (a) type of business, 
(b) years in business, (c) number of full-time employees, (d) 
annual sales, (e) organization type (corporation or propri- 
etorship), (f) owner's share, (g) assets and liabilities, (h) 
whether the business is a party to any lawsuit, and (i) 
whether any back taxes are owed. Regarding the owner's 
personal finances, banks typically ask for: (a) assets and 
liabilities, (b) sources and levels of income, and (c) whether 
the owner has any contingent liabilities. Some applications 
ask explicitly if the firm qualifies as a minority-owned 
enterprise for the purposes of certain government loan 
guarantee programs. The race of the applicant, however, 
would be readily identifiable even in the absence of such a 
question, because most loans originate in face-to-face con- 
tact with a representative of the financial institution. The 
same would be true of the applicant's gender. 
These criteria closely match the information available to 
us in the NSSBF, especially in 1998, when we have access 
to the owner's personal housing wealth and nonhousing net 
worth. The particular strength of the survey is the detail 
available on the firm, which covers virtually all of the 
information typically requested on loan application forms. 
Our creditworthiness measures provide us with extensive 
information regarding the financial condition of the firm, 
17 On the other hand, if financial institutions discriminate against black- 
owned firms, then the greater likelihood of denial for blacks in earlier 
years is likely to hurt the performance of those firms and make them look 
less creditworthy. Therefore, controlling for creditworthiness may work to 
understate the presence of discrimination. 18 See Appendix B in Blanchflower et al. (1998) for an example of a 
especially in 1998, when we have the firms' credit rating at 
our disposal. 
A minor shortcoming in these data that we have identified 
is that lenders require additional information on the finances 
of the owner of the firm that is not available in the NSSBF 
data. We have some information on the firm owner's per- 
sonal finances, particularly in 1998 when we have access to 
his/her housing and nonhousing wealth. However, we do not 
have direct information regarding other components of 
personal finance, like the owner's income and contingent 
liabilities. These factors would be necessary in addition to 
his/her housing and nonhousing wealth to identify whether 
the business owner has sufficient personal resources to draw 
upon should the business encounter difficulties and to fur- 
ther determine the personal collateral available should the 
firm default on its obligation. We do have measures of the 
owner's human capital in the form of education and expe- 
rience, which likely captures at least some of the differential 
in available personal wealth across firm owners. Neverthe- 
less, our potentially incomplete characterization of the busi- 
ness owner's personal financial condition may introduce a 
bias into our analysis if black business owners are less able 
to personally repay a loan if the business itself cannot. 
To assess the possible effect of this problem on our 
results, we separately examined groups of firms that differ 
in the degree to which personal finances should influence 
the loan decision and compare the estimated disadvantage 
experienced by black-owned firms in the different groups. 
For completeness, we do the same for other racial/ethnic 
groups, as well as for women. First, we examine proprietor- 
ships/partnerships separately from corporations, for owners 
of an incorporated business are at least somewhat shielded 
from incurring the costs of a failed business. Second, we 
divide firms according to their size and age.19 Both larger 
small businesses and those that have been in existence for 
some time are more likely to rely on the business's, rather 
than the owner's, funds to repay its obligations. Third, we 
consider firms that have applied for loans to obtain working 
capital separately from firms that seek funds for other 
purposes (mainly to purchase vehicles, machinery and 
equipment, and buildings/land). Loans made for one of 
these other purposes at least partially provide their own 
collateral because the financial institution could sell them, 
albeit at a somewhat reduced rate, should the business 
default. Unfortunately, we are only able to estimate these 
models for 1993, because the purpose of the loan is not 
included in the 1998 survey. For the remainder of this 
19 The mean and the median age of firms are 15 and 12 years, respec- 
tively, in the 1993 survey. In the 1998 survey, they are 14 and 11 years. 
Only 14.5% and 20.5% are less than five years old in 1993 and 1998, 
respectively, and only 4.1% and 8.0% are less than three years old, 
respectively. As reported in footnote 2, the mean and the median size of 
firms are 5.5 and 31.6 full-time equivalent workers, respectively, in the 
1993 survey, and 5.0 and 25.5 workers, respectively, in the 1998 survey. 
Fourteen percent of firms have one or fewer employees, and 27% have 
two or fewer employees in 1993, whereas 35% of firms have one or fewer 
typical application form. 
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TABLE 4.-ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF LOAN DENIAL MODELS, 1993 NSSBF DATA (PROBIT DERIVATIVES, T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
Asian/Pacific Native Sample 
Specification Black Islander American Hispanic Female Size 
Organization type 
(1) Proprietorships and Partnerships .253 .209 .404 .072 -.0196 539 
(3.41) (2.04) (0.95) (0.87) (0.37) 
(2) Corporations .193 .095 -.056 .0570 1,450 
(3.83) (1.51) -(0.90) (1.68) 
Age of firm 
(3) 12 years or under .250 .178 -.105 .030 .0002 1,071 
(4.41) (2.55) (0.61) (0.43) (0.00) 
(4) Over 12 years .175 -.010 -.105 .121 920 
(2.88) (0.13) -(1.51) (2.67) 
1990 firm size 
(5) Fewer than 10 employees .199 .100 -.035 .033 -.015 962 
(3.89) (1.41) (0.17) (0.53) (0.42) 
(6) 10 or more employees .244 .146 -.148 .088 1,027 
(3.38) (1.77) -(1.78) (2.05) 
Use of loan 
(7) Working capital .247 .051 -.006 .034 1,082 
(4.67) (0.76) (0.09) (0.86) 
(8) Other use .157 .243 -.073 .138 .046 912 
(2.31) (2.75) (0.48) (1.85) (1.10) 
Sales market 
(9) Local .140 .138 - -.006 .020 871 
(2.24) (1.98) (0.10) (0.50) 
(10) Regional, national, or international .291 .067 -.105 .155 .049 1,124 
(5.19) (0.84) (0.76) (1.93) (1.21) 
Creditworthiness 
(11) No past problems .213 .167 - .026 .060 1,380 
(4.04) (3.04) (0.57) (2.11) 
(12) One past problem .256 -.071 - .202 .044 374 
(2.67) (0.46) (1.44) (0.54) 
(13) More than one problem .266 .266 .145 -.059 -.197 231 
(2.56) (1.75) (0.38) (0.33) (1.70) 
Each row of this table represents a separate regression with the same control variables as row (3) of the top panel of table 3. The dependent variable in each specification represents an indicator for whether or 
not a loan application was denied. Native Americans include American Indians and Alaskan Eskimos. 
Source: Authors' calculations from 1993 NSSBF. 
discussion, for brevity we focus our attention on the results 
for black- versus white-owned firms, for it is differences 
between these groups that have been (and will be) largely 
robust to alternative specifications. 
Results from these analyses are reported in rows (1) 
through (8) of table 4 and rows (1) through (6) of table 5, 
using the 1993 and 1998 data, respectively. They provide 
little indication that omitting some characteristics of the 
owner's personal finances biases the results presented ear- 
lier.20 Estimates indicate that black-owned small businesses 
are significantly more likely to have their loan applications 
rejected in virtually all categories of firms considered. In 
particular-with the exception of larger firms in 1998- 
corporations, older firms, larger firms, and firms seeking 
20 The estimates we present in these specifications are obtained from 
models comparable to those in rows (3) and (5) using the 1993 and 1998 
data, respectively, from table 3. These specifications include all the credit 
history measures, other firm characteristics, and characteristics of the loan, 
but not the complete set of control variables included in the rows 4 and 5 
of these tables. We have chosen to report the more parsimonious specifi- 
cation because the evidence indicates that those models which include the 
full set of control variables do not fit any better and provide virtually 
identical estimates of the disadvantage faced by black-owned firms in 
obtaining credit. Estimates from the more parsimonious specification 
improve the precision of our estimates, which is particularly useful given 
the smaller samples in each category of firms. 
credit for uses other than working capital are between 13 
and 25 percentage points more likely to have the loan 
application rejected if black-owned, even though personal 
resources should be less important in these categories. 
Moreover, in each group of two firm types (large versus 
small, etc.), the estimates are not significantly different from 
each other. 
Another issue that needs to be considered in interpreting 
the results presented so far is whether or not the ceteris 
paribus differential by race in loan denial rates is attribut- 
able to differences in the geographic location of black- and 
white-owned firms. If, for example, black-owned firms are 
more likely to locate in the central city, and a central city 
location is negatively correlated with profitability and the 
ability to repay debt, then financial institutions may be 
acting optimally. Here, we present a limited analysis to 
address whether or not this type of behavior takes place. 
To identify whether lenders' behavior is consistent with 
this hypothesis, we distinguish those firms that self- 
classified their sales market as being local versus regional, 
national, or international. A central city location should have 
a greater effect on future profit expectations for those firms 
that operate on a local level. If minority-owned firms are 
more likely to locate in the central city, racial differences in 
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TABLE 5.-ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS OF LOAN DENIAL MODELS, 1998 SSBF DATA (PROBIT DERIVATIVES, T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
Asians/Pacific Sample 
Specification Black Islander Hispanic Female Size 
Organization type 
(1) Proprietorships and partnerships .370 .214 .419 -.022 346 
(3.87) (1.75) (3.46) (0.31) 
(2) Corporations .134 .080 .089 .021 569 
(1.97) (1.23) (1.19) (0.51) 
Age of firm 
(3) 12 years or under .232 .150 .222 -.023 542 
(2.87) (1.76) (2.44) (0.42) 
(4) Over 12 years .248 .145 .231 .044 378 
(2.95) (1.69) (1.92) (0.94) 
1998 firm size 
(5) Fewer than 10 employees .343 .240 .282 .009 456 
(4.28) (2.29) (2.68) (0.15) 
(6) 10 or more employees .027 .001 .143 -.003 454 
(0.42) (0.02) (1.88) (0.08) 
Sales market 
(7) Local .292 .179 .329 -.040 449 
(3.49) (1.91) (3.11) (0.81) 
(8) Regional, national, or international .201 .123 .190 .044 468 
(2.40) (1.50) (1.99) (0.83) 
Creditworthiness 
(9) No past problems .210 .078 .187 -.003 627 
(3.37) (1.44) (2.64) (0.09) 
(10) One or more past problems .304 .178 .217 .056 289 
(2.71) (1.21) (1.63) (0.63) 
Dunn & Bradstreet credit rating 
(11) Low, moderate, or average risk .224 .116 .133 -.000 591 
(3.14) (1.71) (1.60) (0.01) 
(12) Significant or high risk .265 .168 .376 .003 321 
(2.60) (1.39) (3.17) (0.04) 
Each row of this table represents a separate regression with the same control variables as row (5) of the middle panel of table 3. The dependent variable in each specification represents an indicator for whether 
or not a loan application was denied. Asian/Pacific Islanders includes Asians, Pacific Islanders, American Indians, and Alaskan Eskimos. 
Source: Authors' calculations from 1998 SSBF 
loan approval rates and interest rates charged should be 
greater in the firms that sell in the local marketplace. The 
results of this test are reported in rows (9) and (10) of table 
4 and rows (7) and (8) of table 5 for 1993 and 1998, 
respectively. They reject the hypothesis that observed dif- 
ferences can be attributable to different propensities to 
locate in the center of a city. Estimates indicate that black- 
owned firms operating both in local sales markets and 
elsewhere face a sizable increase in the likelihood their loan 
application will be denied in both surveys. The estimates are 
all significantly different from zero, but not significantly 
different from each other across sales markets within a 
survey year. 
We also estimate models that address a potential weak- 
ness in the specific functional form with which we control 
for differences in credit history across firms. As shown in 
table 1, black-owned firms are considerably more likely to 
have had troubles in the past in the form of judgments 
against them, late payments by the firm or its owner, or past 
bankruptcies, and their credit ratings are lower than those of 
white-owned firms. The model specifications reported so far 
implicitly assume that these past problems are linear in their 
effects, and one might suspect the marginal impact would 
rise as credit problems rise. Therefore, we separate firms by 
the number of types of past problems experienced and, in 
1998, an indicator of high risk based on a firm's credit 
rating. The results are reported in rows (11) to (13) in table 
4 and rows (9) to (12) in table 5 for 1993 and 1998, 
respectively. They suggest that even black-owned firms with 
clean credit histories and at a lower risk of default are at a 
significant disadvantage in getting their loans approved, 
holding constant their other characteristics. 
Finally, we consider whether black-owned firms are 
treated differently from white-owned firms when requesting 
credit from other sources. If minority-owned firms really are 
less creditworthy, then other types of creditors also may be 
reluctant o provide them with credit. On the other hand, if 
they are able to obtain other kinds of credit at roughly the 
same rate regardless of the owner's race, then perhaps the 
disadvantage that black-owned firms face when they apply 
for loans from financial institutions is more likely attribut- 
able to discrimination. 
The source of credit we examine is credit-card use. Such 
an analysis provides a unique advantage because credit-card 
applications are more likely to be filled out and mailed in, so 
it is quite likely that the race of the applicant is unknown to 
the financial institution.21 The NSSBF asked respondents 
21 In fact, it is our understanding that it is illegal for creditors to ask an 
applicant about his/her race on a credit application. Lenders to small 
businesses appear to be exempt from this restriction, from what we can 
determine, so long as they are asking whether the entity is a certified 
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TABLE 6.-MODELS OF CREDIT CARD USE (PROBIT DERIVATIVES, T-STATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
Asian/Pacific Native Sample 
Specification Black Islander American Hispanic Female Size 
1993 Data 
(1) Business credit card .032 -.102 .072 .029 -.005 4,618 
(1.26) (3.51) (0.86) (0.95) (0.27) 
(2) Personal credit card .015 -.028 -.004 -.045 .024 4,618 
(0.58) (0.96) (0.05) (1.50) (1.26) 
1998 Data 
(1) Business credit card -.014 -.053 - -.024 -.042 3,457 
(0.42) (1.54) (0.62) (1.97) 
(2) Personal credit card -.016 .040 - -.050 .023 3,457 
(0.49) (1.17) -(1.31) (1.11) 
Each row of this table represents a separate regression with the same control variables as row (3) of table 4, but excluding the loan characteristics. The dependent variable indicates whether the firm used business 
or personal credit cards to finance business expenses. In all specifications, the sample size is all firms. Native Americans include American Indians and Alaskan Eskimos. 
Source: Authors' calculations from 1993 and 1998 NSSBF. 
whether they used either a business or personal credit card 
for business purposes. Although our analysis of use of credit 
cards does not condition on application, a finding that black- 
and white-owned small businesses are equally likely to use 
credit cards may still provide evidence supporting discrim- 
ination in small-business lending. In fact, if financial insti- 
tutions discriminate against blacks in obtaining small- 
business loans, we may even expect to see them use credit 
cards more often than whites, because they have fewer 
alternatives. Even though many institutions may offer both 
types of credit, they may only be aware of the race of the 
applicant in a small-business loan. 
In table 6 we examine the probability that a firm uses 
either a business credit card or a personal credit card to 
finance business expenses in the 1993 and the 1998 data, 
holding constant other differences across firms.22 In neither 
case could we find any evidence that black-owned firms 
were less likely to have access to such cards. We also had 
information available on the maximum amount that could 
be billed to these accounts and found no significant differ- 
ence by race in regression models of the amount that could 
be charged. No racial differences were observed when we 
modeled the typical balance remaining on these cards at the 
end of a typical month (results not reported). 
C. Models of Interest Rates Charged 
Although most of our analysis has addressed whether 
minority- and white-owned firms are treated equally in 
terms of their probability of denial, another way that differ- 
ential treatment may emerge is through the interest rate 
charged for approved loans. Discrimination may be appar- 
ent if banks approve loans to equally creditworthy minority- 
and white-owned firms, but charge the minority-owned 
minority-owned small business for the purpose of determining eligibility 
for Small Business Administration loan guarantees. In either case, it is 
illegal to use race as a factor in determining whether or not to grant a loan. 
22 On average, in the 1993 survey 29% of all firms use business credit 
cards and 41% use personal credit cards for business use. The comparable 
statistics for 1998 are 34% and 46%. These levels vary only modestly by 
race/ethnicity. 
firms a higher rate of interest.23 Therefore we estimated 
model specifications analogous to those reported previously 
for loan denials, but now the dependent variable represents 
the interest rate charged for firms whose loans were ap- 
proved. Along with the control variables included in our 
earlier analysis, in these models we also control for loan 
characteristics, including whether the loan carried a fixed or 
variable interest rate, the loan amount, the length of the 
loan, whether the loan was guaranteed, whether the loan 
was secured by collateral, and a set of variables identifying 
the type of collateral used if the loan was secured. 
The results of this analysis are reported in table 7. The top 
two panels provide the results of specifications comparable 
to those in table 3 for loan denials and represent our main 
specifications. Here we see that in both 1993 and in 1998, 
black-owned firms are charged interest rates that are 1.5 
percentage points higher than white-owned firms before 
controlling for other factors.24 Models that include an ex- 
tensive array of controls (including Dunn and Bradstreet's 
credit rating and the owner's housing wealth and nonhous- 
ing net worth in 1998) still indicate that blacks are charged 
about a full percentage point higher rate of interest than 
equally creditworthy white-owned firms. Depending upon 
the specification, the year, and the group considered, other 
racial groups are sometimes found to face higher interest 
rates that whites, but none of these findings are consistent 
enough to draw strong conclusions. 
We also have estimated similar specification checks with 
interest rates that we conducted in the loan denial models 
earlier. In the present context, however, the smaller sample 
of loans in the 1998 survey than in 1993 led to an even 
smaller sample of approved loans, which prevented us from 
conducting an analogous exercise with the more recent data. 
The third panel of table 7 presents these specification checks 
23 The sizes of the loans requested by, or granted to, white- and 
minority-owned firms are not statistically significantly different. 
24 These differences are not the same as those observed in table 1, which 
just reports sample means, mainly because we use sample weights in 
calculating means, but we do not do so in the regression models. 
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TABLE 7.-MODELS OF INTEREST RATE CHARGED (OLS COEFFICIENTS, T- TATISTICS IN PARENTHESES) 
Asian/Pacific Native Sample 
Specification Black Islander American Hispanic Female Size 
Main Specifications-1993 Data 
Additional variables included: 
(1) None 
(2) Model 1 plus creditworthiness measures and 
owner's education 
(3) Model 2 plus other firm characteristics and 
characteristics of the loan 
(4) Model 3 plus region and industry fixed effects 
(5) Model 4 plus month/year of application and type 
of financial-institution fixed effects 
1.505 
(5.54) 
1.402 
(5.10) 
1.031 
(3.80) 
1.033 
(3.72) 
.984 
(3.57) 
.757 
(2.50) 
.829 
(2.74) 
.505 
(1.71) 
.411 
(1.34) 
.350 
(1.18) 
-.192 
(0.27) 
-.291 
(0.41) 
-.550 
(0.79) 
-.488 
(0.69) 
-.445 
(0.66) 
.987 
(3.78) 
.910 
(3.50) 
.543 
(2.10) 
.471 
(1.75) 
.515 
(1.96) 
.333 
(2.10) 
.230 
(1.45) 
-.055 
(0.35) 
-.103 
(0.64) 
-.110 
(0.70) 
Main Specifications-1998 Data 
Additional variables included: 
(1) None 
(2) Model 1 plus creditworthiness measures 
(including credit rating) and owner's education 
(3) Model 2 plus other firm characteristics (including 
personal wealth) and characteristics of the loan 
(4) Model 3 plus region and industry fixed effects 
(5) Model 4 plus year of application 
1.549 
(4.10) 
1.447 
(3.79) 
1.243 
(3.30) 
1.204 
(2.97) 
1.224 
(2.99) 
.699 
(2.00) 
.826 
(2.36) 
.761 
(2.19) 
.833 
(2.26) 
.846 
(2.29) 
.356 
(0.80) 
0.073 
(0.16) 
-.091 
(0.21) 
-.320 
(0.70) 
-.333 
(0.72) 
Alternative Specifications-1993 Data 
Organization type: 
(6) Proprietorships and partnerships 1.677 
(2.84) 
.657 
(2.12) 
(7) Corporations 
Age of firm: 
(8) 12 years or under 
(9) Older than 12 years 
1990 firm size: 
(10) Fewer than 10 employees 
(11) 10 or more employees 
Sales market: 
(12) Local 
(13) Regional, national, or international 
Creditworthiness: 
(14) No past problems 
1.106 
(2.90) 
.814 
(2.01) 
1.361 
(3.44) 
.271 
(0.64) 
.644 
(1.48) 
1.419 
(4.00) 
1.548 
(4.46) 
.771 
(1.19) 
.540 
(1.61) 
.299 
(0.73) 
.778 
(1.77) 
.453 
(0.97) 
.815 
(2.07) 
-.117 
(0.25) 
1.069 
(2.67) 
.448 
(1.32) 
.016 
(0.01) 
-.687 
(0.99) 
-.627 
(0.72) 
-.218 
(0.16) 
-.818 
(0.68) 
-.336 
(0.41) 
1.492 
(1.00) 
-1.332 
(1.73) 
.618 
(0.74) 
.312 
(0.58) 
.586 
(1.90) 
.141 
(0.38) 
1.090 
(2.89) 
.583 
(1.53) 
.804 
(2.02) 
.530 
(1.48) 
.549 
(1.36) 
.521 
(1.89) 
-.509 
(1.44) 
.112 
(0.64) 
.010 
(0.05) 
-.048 
(0.20) 
-.163 
(0.66) 
.060 
(0.29) 
.152 
(0.61) 
-.260 
(1.23) 
-.050 
(0.28) 
362 
1,086 
719 
729 
640 
808 
631 
817 
1,133 
Each row of this table represents a separate regression with all of the control variables as row (3). The specific covariates are reported in the notes to table 4, except that loan characteristics also include an indicator 
variable for whether the request was for a fixed-interest-rate loan, the length of the loan, the size of the loan, whether the loan was guaranteed, whether the loan was secured by collateral, and seven variables identifying 
the type of collateral used if the loan was secured. The sample consists of firms that had applied for a loan and had their application approved. "No credit problems" means that neither the firm nor the owner had 
been delinquent on payments over 60 days, there had been no judgments against the owner for the preceding 3 years, and the owner had not been bankrupt in the preceding 7 years. Native Americans include American 
Indians and Alaskan Eskimos. In the 1998 data the categories Asian/Pacific Islander and Native American are combined due to small numbers of observations. 
Source: Authors' calculations from 1993 NSSBF. 
for the 1993 survey. Among both corporations and older sample of firms with no past credit problems, black-owned 
firms, black-owned businesses are still found to face sizable firms pay significantly higher interest rates. The only piece 
differences in interest rates charged. Firms that sell in the of contradictory evidence is that among larger firms, those 
local market face a smaller interest-rate disadvantage than owned by blacks pay higher interest rates, but the difference 
firms that sell to a broader market, although the estimated is not significant. Taken collectively, however, the evidence 
difference is not statistically significant. Even among a presented here supports the notion that black-owned firms 
1,455 
1,455 
1,448 
1,448 
1,448 
-.150 
(0.68) 
-.184 
(0.83) 
-.300 
(1.36) 
-.125 
(0.52) 
-.099 
(0.41) 
768 
768 
768 
768 
768 
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pay higher interest rates than otherwise comparable white- 
owned firms, and this difference does not appear to be 
related to problems of model specification. 
VI. Caveats 
The results presented indicate that black-owned firms, in 
particular, face obstacles in obtaining credit that are unre- 
lated to their creditworthiness. We are unable to find any 
consistent evidence that other racial/ethnic groups or 
women are similarly disadvantaged. Although one explana- 
tion for these findings is that black-owned firms are dis- 
criminated against, we raise a few additional factors worth 
considering before one can draw definitive conclusions. 
First, as in any regression-based study, our analysis 
hinges upon the proposition that all the factors that are 
related to loan denial rates by race have been included in our 
statistical model. If, for example, blacks possess some 
unobservable characteristic that makes them less creditwor- 
thy, then our statistical finding would overstate the extent of 
discrimination. To reduce this possibility, the models we 
have estimated include an extensive array of factors that 
could conceivably affect loan decisions. Using the 1998 
NSSBF data, we have also included each firm's credit rating 
and the owner's personal housing and nonhousing wealth as 
additional control variables. Models including these addi- 
tional variables provide virtually identical results to those 
that use the set of firm and owner characteristics available in 
both survey years. Moreover, we have also estimated sev- 
eral alternative specifications that might identify the effect 
of such a bias. Throughout, we have consistently found that 
blacks are disadvantaged in the small-business credit market 
and that our specification tests support the interpretation of 
discrimination. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that a bias in 
that direction may remain. 
Offsetting this potential bias is the fact that those minority- 
owned firms that actually apply for credit may represent a 
selected sample of the most creditworthy. More marginal 
minority-owned firms whose loans might have been ac- 
cepted had they been owned by whites may not even be in 
the pool of loan applicants. First, these firms may have gone 
out of business or may not have had the opportunity to 
commence operations because of their inability to obtain 
capital. Second, some existing firms may have chosen not to 
apply for credit because they were afraid their application 
would be rejected due to discrimination. Therefore, the 
results reported above may be biased toward finding too 
small a disparity between white- and black-owned firms. 
Another potential criticism is that this study has exam- 
ined loan denial rates rather than loan default rates. We 
discussed this criticism with regard to home mortgage 
lending earlier in the paper, but an analogous argument can 
be made in the context of small-business loans as well. Yet 
our earlier discussion indicated that this argument rests 
critically upon the assumption that the distribution of loan 
repayment probabilities among white- and black-owned 
firms is identical, suggesting that such evidence would be 
sufficient, but not necessary, to prove the existence of 
discrimination. From a more practical standpoint, such an 
analysis of default rates requires longitudinal data, tracking 
firms for a few years following loan origination, which do 
not exist. Although there are important limitations on such 
an analysis, we believe that it would be fruitful for this sort 
of longitudinal data collection to take place and for future 
research to investigate this question more fully. 
In addition, many of the criticisms levied against Munnell 
et al. (1996) may be relevant here as well. Yet these 
criticisms appear to have been effectively countered by 
some of the authors (see Browne & Tootell, 1995; Tootell, 
1996). What is important to keep in mind in comparing our 
work with theirs is the magnitude of the estimated racial 
disparity. The absolute sizes of the raw racial differences 
found in the mortgage study are considerably smaller than 
those observed in this study regarding business credit.25 
Some of the difference in denial rates between the races in 
both studies appears to be due to differences in the charac- 
teristics of the applicants. Even after controlling for these 
differences, however, the gap in denial rates in the small- 
business credit market is considerably larger than that found 
in the mortgage market.26 The larger size and significance of 
the effects found in our analyses reduce the possibility that 
the observed differences can be explained away by some 
quirk of the econometric estimation procedure. 
VIII. Conclusions 
Our analysis finds significant evidence that black-owned 
businesses face impediments to obtaining credit that go 
beyond observable differences in their creditworthiness. 
These firms are more likely to report that credit availability 
was a problem in the past and expect it to be a problem in 
the future. In fact, these concerns prevent more black- 
owned firms from applying for loans, because they fear 
being turned down due to prejudice or discrimination. We 
also found that loan denial rates are significantly higher for 
black-owned firms than for white-owned firms even after 
taking into account differences in an extensive array of 
measures of creditworthiness and other characteristics. This 
result appears to be largely insensitive to changes in econo- 
metric specification. Similar findings are presented regard- 
ing interest rates charged on approved loans. Overall, the 
evidence is consistent that black-owned firms are disadvan- 
taged in the market for small-business credit, which would 
traditionally be attributed to discrimination. We find no 
consistent evidence of similar disadvantages for other ra- 
cial/ethnic groups or for women. 
25 In the Boston Fed study 10% of whites' mortgage applications were 
rejected, and 28% of blacks'. The differential in loan denial rates for 
business credit is much greater, as shown in table 1. 
26 The ceteris paribus gap between black- and white-owned firms is 
about 25 percentage points in denial rates in both survey years in the 
small-business credit market, compared with 8 percentage points in the 
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The magnitude of the black-white differential in small- 
business loan approval rates is substantial, even after con- 
trolling for observed differences in creditworthiness, and 
considerably larger than that found in the analysis of dis- 
crimination in mortgage markets. Why do the results for 
small-business loans differ so markedly from those for 
mortgage loans? First, many mortgages are sold in the 
secondary market, and a substantial fraction of mortgage 
lenders have little intention of keeping the loans they make. 
This added "distance" in the transaction might reduce the 
likelihood of discrimination. No such sophisticated second- 
ary market for loans to small firms exists. Second, the 
presence of special programs and regulatory incentives to 
encourage banks and others to increase their mortgage 
lending to minorities gives these groups some advantages in 
obtaining a mortgage. Additional research might seek to 
provide alternative explanations. 
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